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ABSTRACT
We argue that even if an agent’s initial responsibilities are not very
demanding, it can become permissible to burden her with signiﬁ-
cant costs if she culpably fails to discharge those responsibilities.
In particular, we defend the claim that even if our responsibilities
to assist others are not initially very demanding, our failure to live
up to them can make us liable to possibly burdensome enforce-
ment costs. Christian Barry and Gerhard Øverland (2016) disagree.
They claim that other things equal, fewer costs may be imposed
on an agent if she culpably fails to live up to her assistance-based
responsibilities as opposed to her responsibilities not to contribute
towards harm. Their thought is that our responsibilities to assist
others are less demanding than our responsibilities not to con-
tribute towards harm, and they assume that this asymmetry is
matched by an asymmetry in the enforceability of the two types
of responsibility. We agree with Barry and Øverland (2016) that our
assistance-based responsibilities are less demanding than our con-
tribution-based responsibilities. We argue that autonomy-based
reasons support this asymmetry. Pace Barry and Øverland (2016),
we claim that there is no reason to think that the two types of
responsibility diﬀer in their enforceability.
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Introduction
It is relatively uncontroversial that as materially well-oﬀ individuals who live in liberal
democracies, we have certain moral responsibilities towards the world’s poor. But what
happens if we culpably fail in these responsibilities? Is it morally permissible for others
to enforce our responsibilities by imposing on us the costs necessary to secure the moral
goods that our responsibilities were meant to protect? At least within deontological
circles, it is standardly assumed that we need to clarify the nature of the responsibilities
that we fail to live up to before we can start to answer these questions. More speciﬁcally,
if we are culpably failing in what Christian Barry and Gerhard Øverland call our
assistance-based responsibilities to help the poor, then – so the thought goes – only
small to moderate costs may be imposed on us to enforce our responsibilities.1 By
CONTACT Lars Christie larc@iﬁkk.uio.no Department of Philosophy, Classics, History of Art and Ideas,
University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
1To date and to our knowledge, questions about the enforceability of assistance-based responsibilities have received
only very limited attention in the philosophical literature. It is one of the virtues of Barry and Øverland’s book that it
directs attention to this issue.
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contrast, if we are culpably failing in our contribution-based responsibilities not to
contribute towards harming the poor, then potentially very signiﬁcant costs may be
imposed on us to enforce our responsibilities. We call this view on the diﬀerent
enforceability of assistance- versus contribution-based responsibilities the Asymmetry
View. In this paper, we argue that the Asymmetry View is false, and that a Symmetry
View should be put in its place instead. More precisely, we argue that whether
a responsibility is contribution- or assistance-based is irrelevant to the level of costs
that may be imposed on an agent who culpably fails to live up to it.
It is not entirely clear whether Barry and Øverland are sympathetic to the Symmetry
View that we defend. Their discussion in chapter 3 suggests that they are. In chapter 3,
Barry and Øverland investigate what happens when an agent fails in her assistance-
based responsibilities. They argue that when an agent could easily assist a person in dire
straits, but chooses not to do so, then the agent can later be required to bear signiﬁcant
costs to assist the person if assisting her has in the meantime become much costlier
(Barry and Øverland, 2016, 33–4). In contrast with this, in chapter 9, Barry and
Øverland introduce Force Implication, a principle according to which our stringent
contribution-based responsibilities are highly enforceable, if necessary through the use
of physical force. As formulated by Barry and Øverland, Force Implication applies only
to contribution-based responsibilities, which suggests – in tension with the arguments
that they present in chapter 3 – that Barry and Øverland endorse an Asymmetry View.
Read as a comment on Barry and Øverland’s thought-provoking book, our paper thus
provides an argument for widening the scope of Force Implication to include assis-
tance-based responsibilities, and in this way to resolve the just described tension in
favour of a Symmetry View.
The demandingness of assistance and contribution-based responsibilities
Some of the responsibilities we have towards the world’s poor are assistance-based.
These responsibilities arise because many of the worlds’ poor are striving to meet
minimal subsistence needs, whereas we in rich parts of the world are generally living
aﬄuent lives. Moreover, we are in a position to assist the poor: there are things that we
can do to help alleviate their suﬀering at little or modest cost to ourselves.
Peter Singer (1972, 2009) is a vocal advocate of the view that most of us are failing in
our assistance-based responsibilities towards the world’s poor. As a utilitarian, Singer
thinks that our assistance-based responsibilities towards the poor are quite demanding,2
but he makes it clear that most of us are failing in our responsibilities even if these
responsibilities are actually much more modest than he thinks they are. From
a utilitarian point of view, it is plausible to assume that our assistance-based responsi-
bilities towards the poor are quite demanding, as it would plausibly increase the sum
total of welfare if we started to make signiﬁcant personal sacriﬁces to help alleviate and
prevent poverty-related harms. But many philosophers – Barry and Øverland included –
resist the claim that our assistance-based responsibilities are possibly quite demanding.
2In this paper, we call a responsibility demanding to the extent that an agent may be required to accept costs in order
to live up to it. What we refer to as demanding Barry and Øverland (6–7) refer to as a constraining. They call
a responsibility demanding to the extent that an agent who fails to live up to it has to bear costs to secure the moral
good the responsibility was meant to protect. We refer to this latter aspect of a responsibility as its enforceability.
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Their basic thought is that we have obligations to help others whose misfortunes we are
not responsible for only if their plight is serious, and only if we are able to provide
eﬀective help at no more than moderate cost3 to ourselves.
Like Peter Singer, Thomas Pogge (2005, 2008) is convinced that most of us are failing
in our responsibilities towards the global poor. But while Singer focuses on assistance-
based responsibilities, Pogge concentrates on our responsibilities to refrain from con-
tributing towards harming the poor. According to Pogge, most of us contribute towards
poverty-related harms by acting in ways that help establish or further entrench ‘institu-
tional arrangements that foreseeably result in more severe or more widespread poverty
or human rights deﬁcits than would feasible alternative institutional arrangements’
(Barry and Øverland, 2016, 122). Pogge (2008, 15) himself puts it more boldly and
claims that we are outrightly ‘harming [the poor by] inﬂicting seriously unjust rules
upon […] them’ (see also Pogge 2005, 60).4
Unlike assistance-based responsibilities, contribution-based responsibilities are com-
monly thought to be possibly very demanding. To see the diﬀerence between the two
types of responsibility, consider the following simpliﬁed cases (where ‘ABR’ and ‘CBR’
stand for assistance- and contribution-based responsibilities, respectively):
MudslideABR.Amudslide is threatening a village. If you – an otherwise uninvolved bystander–
don’t do anything, two villagers will die. If you run to the village and warn the villagers, all
villagers will live, but the option of warning the villagers comes at a certain cost to you.
Mudslide CBR. A mudslide is threatening a village. If you – an otherwise uninvolved
bystander – wait for a while before crossing a speciﬁc passage, the mudslide will remain
contained, and it will not kill anyone. If you cross the passage right away, the mudslide will
gather momentum, and it will kill two villagers.
If Barry and Øverland are right that assistance-based responsibilities are at most
moderately demanding, then the costs that you are morally required to bear to warn
the villagers in Mudslide ABR are limited. If warning the villagers means that you will
miss a movie date, then you will have to miss your date. But if warning the villagers
means putting yourself in harm’s way – maybe because there is a real risk that you will
be buried by the mudslide if you run to the village to issue a warning – then you are not
morally required to help the villagers.
By contrast, in Mudslide CBR, the costs that you are morally required to bear to keep
the mudslide from gathering momentum are generally thought to be potentially very
high. Suppose that a vicious murderer is pursuing you, and that he will catch up with
you and kill you if you don’t cross the relevant passage right away. Most moral
philosophers agree that even if your life is at stake, it is morally impermissible to
cross the passage at once. If you cross the passage at once, you sacriﬁce two innocent
villagers to save your own life, and it is generally accepted that you lack the moral
licence to do so (see e.g. Thomson, 1991, esp. 296; Quong 2009, 507–8).
3We follow Barry and Øverland in understanding costs very broadly as anything that reduces a person’s welfare. On this
understanding, physical harm is a type of cost.
4In the context of this paper, we assume that directly harming a person is a paradigmatic case of contributing towards
harm to that person, but that there are other, more indirect ways of contributing towards harm as well.
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The enforceability of assistance- vs. contribution-based responsibilities
For the purposes of this paper, we accept the asymmetry with respect to the demand-
ingness of assistance- vs. contribution-based responsibilities. What we deny is that
a similar asymmetry obtains with respect to the enforceability of the two types of
responsibility.
We call a responsibility enforceable just in case an agent who has culpably5 failed to
live up to it is not wronged if costs are imposed on her to secure the moral good that the
responsibility was meant to protect. The enforceability of a responsibility increases with
the size of the costs that an agent can be required to bear if she has culpably failed to
discharge that responsibility. To get a better grip on this deﬁnition, consider again
Mudslide CBR. Suppose that you decide to cross the tricky passage right away, maybe
to get to your movie date on time, or maybe to outrun your killer. Whatever your reason,
by deciding to cross the passage right away, you culpably fail in your responsibility not to
contribute towards harm. The moral good that your responsibility protects is the lives of
the two villagers who will die if the mudslide gathers momentum. If we are morally
permitted to impose certain costs on you to ensure that the villagers will live – if we may
for example restrain you to keep you from crossing the passage – and if we do not wrong
you by doing so, then your contribution-based responsibility is enforceable. The more we
may morally permissibly do to you in order to keep you from crossing the passage, the
more enforceable is your responsibility not to contribute towards harming the villagers.
As mentioned, it is usually thought to be permissible to enforce contribution-based
responsibilities through the use of signiﬁcant force. For instance, it is usually assumed
that if an agent threatens to culpably inﬂict harm on a victim, then the victim, or a third
party acting on the victim’s behalf, is permitted to defend the victim against the
impending harm provided two conditions are met. First, the costs imposed on the
attacker must be proportionate to the harm averted. If an attacker threatens only to
punch his victim, then it is disproportionate to kill him to keep him from doing
so. Second, the costs imposed on the attacker must be necessary to avert harm to the
victim. If it suﬃces to forcibly restrain an attacker to keep him from hurting his victim,
it is impermissible to kill him, even if killing him would be proportionate.
In support of the view that contribution-based responsibilities may permissibly be
enforced through the use of potentially signiﬁcant force, Barry and Øverland defend the
‘conditional claim that if we possess stringent contribution-based responsibilities
[towards the world’s poor], then we are liable to the use of defensive force’ [if we fail
to discharge these responsibilities] (Barry and Øverland, 2016, 173, original emphasis).
Barry and Øverland call this conditional claim Force Implication. The fact that they
formulate Force Implication only with respect to contribution-based responsibilities
suggests that in their view, a responsibility’s enforceability rises with its demandingness.
After all, the main diﬀerence between the two types of responsibility is that contribu-
tion-based responsibilities, unlike assistance-based responsibilities, are potentially very
demanding. If Barry and Øverland are correct to suggest that the scope of Force
5In this paper, we limit our attention to the problem of what may be done to an agent who has culpably failed to
discharge her responsibilities. Barry and Øverland (see e.g. 186) assume that we can – at least to a reduced extent –
enforce an agent’s responsibilities even if she has failed to live up to them in an entirely non-culpable manner. We
doubt that this is the case, but we will not pursue this further here.
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Implication extends only to contribution-based responsibilities, then the Asymmetry
View is correct, and assistance-based responsibilities are never permissibly enforceable
through the use of signiﬁcant force.
Although our aim is to argue against the Asymmetry View, we grant that it is prima
facie plausible. To see what lends the Asymmetry View its initial plausibility, consider
again the two mudslide cases. In both cases, the moral good at stake is the same, and it
is highly signiﬁcant. If you fail to live up to your responsibilities in either case, two
innocent villagers will die. Now in Mudslide CBR, we said that your contribution-based
responsibility is highly enforceable: if you attempt to cross the relevant passage right
away, others can kill you without wronging you if this is necessary to keep you from
crossing the passage. In Mudslide ABR, by contrast, if you culpably refuse to warn the
villagers because it would be inconvenient for you to do so, it seems counterintuitive
that others would not wrong you if they inﬂicted serious harm on you to keep the
villagers safe. After all, you had no assistance-based responsibility to suﬀer serious harm
to keep the villagers safe, so why should others now have the right to inﬂict this harm
on you to guarantee the villagers’ safety?
The Asymmetry View is not only prima facie plausible; it is also the view that is
standardly held by moral philosophers working on the distinction between our positive
duties to aid and our negative duties not to harm.6 By contrast, the Symmetry View that
we defend in this paper does not seem to be explicitly endorsed by anyone.7 According
to the Symmetry View, contribution- and assistance-based responsibilities are similarly
enforceable if we hold ﬁxed the moral good that the responsibilities protect. As long as the
costs imposed on the culpable agent are proportionate and necessary, the culpable agent
is liable to have these costs imposed on her. It follows that on the Symmetry View,
whatever costs you are liable to have imposed on you if you culpably fail in your
responsibilities in Mudslide CBR, you are also liable to have imposed on you if you
culpably fail in your responsibilities in Mudslide ABR. Hence if you make yourself liable
to be killed if you culpably fail to discharge your responsibility in Mudslide CBR – as we
think you do, provided killing you is necessary to keep the villagers safe – then you can
become similarly liable to be killed in Mudslide ABR.
At ﬁrst blush, the Symmetry View may seem implausibly harsh. But once we
consider what we take to be the most plausible rationale behind the view that assis-
tance-based responsibilities are at most moderately demanding, it becomes doubtful
that we should accept the putative positive correlation between the demandingness and
the enforceability of a responsibility that Force Implication intimates.
In our view, the most compelling justiﬁcation of the claim that assistance-based
responsibilities are at most moderately demanding appeals to the value of autonomy.8 If
our responsibilities to help others are limited in nature, this prevents morality from
becoming overly burdensome. Extensive and possibly very demanding assistance-based
responsibilities would interfere with our ability to lead a self-determined life, as they
would dramatically reduce our freedom to pursue a variety of plans and projects that we
6For a defence of the standard view, see e.g. (Kamm 2007, 17–21).
7Victor Tadros (2014, esp. 365–6) argues for a view that approaches, but nevertheless stops short of, the Symmetry View.
8Barry and Øverland (2016, 28) also invoke the notion of autonomy to justify the view that assistance-based
responsibilities are at most moderately demanding. They do not, however, go into any detail about the relationship
between autonomy and responsibilities.
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ﬁnd personally meaningful. By contrast, if assistance-based responsibilities are only
moderately demanding, this will generally leave us with an agentially meaningful and
valuable set of permissible options for action.
Unlike assistance-based responsibilities, highly demanding contribution-based
responsibilities do not similarly conﬂict with the value of autonomy, as they usually
leave agents with a range of signiﬁcant options for action. The general thought here is
that contribution-based responsibilities only constrain our behaviour by excluding
certain options from the set of actions that we may permissibly perform; they do not
dictate to us particular ways in which we ought to allocate our time, our money, or our
attention. To illustrate, if I am morally required never to kill anyone, this is not
a meddlesome requirement: I can generally respect it while living my life in any of
a number of meaningful ways. Whereas if I have a duty to try and ensure that no one
dies a premature death, I have my work cut out for me – if I want to live up to this duty,
this will to a large extent determine what shape my life can take.
Suppose, as we do in the context of this paper, that this autonomy-based rationale in
favour of only moderately demanding assistance-based responsibilities is correct. If so,
it suﬃces to protect the value of autonomy that our assistance-based responsibilities are
limited in their demandingness. There is no need to have similar limitations built into
their enforceability. On the view that we defend, whatever enforcement costs that exceed
the moderate costs that an agent was initially required to bear are always costs that the
agent had a prior chance to avoid. Moreover, they are costs that the agent would have
avoided had she lived up to her moral responsibilities (cf. Tadros 2014, 365). The fact
that moderately demanding responsibilities are highly enforceable therefore does not
prevent an agent from living a self-determined life. As long as the agent sticks by
moderately demanding moral rules, she gets to pursue plans and projects of her own.
In sum, there needn’t be any constraints on the enforceability of our assistance-based
responsibilities to protect the value of autonomy.9 Yet this in turn raises the question
what the appropriate considerations are that determine the extent to which our
responsibilities are enforceable. In their discussion of this question, Barry and
Øverland (2016, 38) refer to Jeﬀ McMahan’s account of liability to defensive harm. If
an agent is liable to a particular harm, she is not wronged if others inﬂict that harm on
her. According to McMahan (2002), an agent’s liability to defensive harm is grounded
in considerations of local distributive justice. More precisely, McMahan claims that an
agent becomes liable to defensive harm just in case she is morally responsible10 for
a threat of unjustiﬁed harm towards someone else. McMahan’s basic idea is that it is
generally least unjust if the person who is responsible for a threat of unjustiﬁed harm is
burdened with the costs that will necessarily accrue if the threat of unjustiﬁed harm is
to be averted (McMahan 2002, 401–5). While McMahan spells out this rationale only
with respect to contribution-based responsibilities, we think that a similar rationale can
9Tadros (2014, 367) argues that our right to live self-determined lives would be ‘too fragile’ if our sometimes quite
understandable ‘diﬃculties [to conform to our] positive obligations’ could make us liable to be killed. We agree with
Tadros that it can be diﬃcult to conform to one’s assistance-based responsibilities, for instance because it is not
always clear what these responsibilities amount to. But to the extent that such diﬃculties are genuine, they will tend
to excuse agents for their failures to live up to their assistance-based responsibilities, and an excused agent is not
culpable for her transgressions.
10On McMahan’s use of the term, an agent can be morally responsible for a threat of unjustiﬁed harm without being
blameworthy for it. We disregard this complication here.
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be formulated also for assistance-based responsibilities. More precisely, it seems to us
that when an agent culpably fails in her assistance-based responsibilities, it is generally
least unjust if she has to bear the costs that are necessary to secure the moral good that
the agent had a moral responsibility to protect. After all, the agent had an initial moral
responsibility to protect the good in question, and she could have avoided being
burdened with signiﬁcant costs simply by living up to this responsibility. In sum,
while the demandingness of assistance-based responsibilities is plausibly constrained
by the value of autonomy, their enforceability is governed by considerations of justice,
and considerations of justice speak in favour of burdening a culpable agent with
potentially signiﬁcant enforcement costs.
Methodologically speaking, we believe that Barry and Øverland have done a valuable
job at identifying diﬀerent normative characteristics of responsibilities, in particular by
drawing attention to the diﬀerence between a responsibility’s demandingness and its
enforceability. But we also believe that more work needs to be done to explore the
relationship between these diﬀerent characteristics. It seems to us that a fruitful way of
doing this is by investigating what considerations might ground or constrain the
diﬀerent normative characteristics.
Conclusion
To be poor is to be deprived of the material security that is needed to lead a ﬂourishing
life. For a poor person, seemingly minor disturbances can quickly become life-
threatening. It follows that if we culpably fail to live up to our responsibilities towards
the world’s poor, we fail to secure important moral goods. On the Symmetry View, this
means that we become liable to the inﬂiction of necessary and proportionate harm,
regardless of whether our responsibility was assistance- or contribution-based. This
suggests that at least in principle, redistributive wars fought by the poor, or fought on
behalf of the poor, could be morally permissible (for defences of such a view, see
Lippert-Rasmussen 2013; Fabre 2012).
While the Symmetry View has this implication in principle, its practical implications
are most likely far less dramatic. According to the Symmetry View, those who culpably fail
to discharge their poverty-related responsibilities only become liable to harm if such harm
is both necessary and proportionate to the reduction in poverty-related harms that is
thereby achieved. Yet in the world as we know it, it is diﬃcult to see how the use of
violence could help reduce poverty. Physically harming aﬄuent people in the ﬁght against
poverty sounds like a futile undertaking at best; at worst, it sounds like an ill-conceived
idea that would inevitably backﬁre (cf. Pogge 2013). Needless to say, futile or counter-
productive use of force can never be justiﬁed, and would wrong those who are harmed.
Ways of imposing cost that do not include the use of physical violence – think hacking
the bank accounts of relevantly culpable aﬄuent individuals – are more plausible candi-
dates for the permissible enforcement of our poverty-related responsibilities. But even with
non-violent measures, it seems doubtful that they could sustainably reduce or put an end to
poverty if they are not also accompanied by institutional reform. And it is extremely
diﬃcult to see how institutional reform could ever be pushed through, violently or not,
in the absence of aﬄuent countries’ willing cooperation.
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These considerations suggest that even if poverty-related responsibilities are enforce-
able through violent means in principle, they are not enforceable through violent means
under present circumstances. In light of this fact, it is all the more important that other
avenues for combating poverty are explored, and that sustained philosophical and
political attention is directed at how we can best live up to our responsibilities towards
the global poor.
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